Transimperial Genealogies of Korea as a Protectorate: The Egypt Model in Japan’s Politics of Colonial Comparison by Mizutani, Satoshi
UC Berkeley
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review
Title
Transimperial Genealogies of Korea as a Protectorate: The Egypt Model in Japan’s Politics of 
Colonial Comparison
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7hb3g7j1
Journal
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, 1(32)
ISSN
2158-9674
Author
Mizutani, Satoshi
Publication Date
2019-09-01
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
		
Cross-Currents	32	|	22	
	
Transimperial	Genealogies	of	Korea	as	a	Protectorate:	The	Egypt	Model	in	
Japan’s	Politics	of	Colonial	Comparison	
	
Satoshi	Mizutani,	Doshisha	University	
	
Mizutani,	Satoshi.	2019.	“Transimperial	Genealogies	of	Korea	as	a	Protectorate:	The	Egypt	Model	
in	Japan’s	Politics	of	Colonial	Comparison.”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	
(e-journal)	32:	22–	49.	https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/	issue-32/mizutani.	
	
Abstract	
	
Focusing	 on	 the	 three-year	 period	 starting	 in	 1904,	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 Japan’s	
colonization	of	Korea,	this	article	demonstrates	how	the	idea	of	British	rule	in	Egypt	as	a	
model	of	colonial	rule	played	a	critical	role	in	the	emergence	of	Korea	as	a	protectorate.	
The	article	not	only	describes	the	scope	and	limits	of	Egypt	as	a	model	but	also	helps	to	
reveal	the	motivations	of	those	Japanese	involved	in	the	comparative	debate;	How	did	
they	 promote―or	 oppose―this	 model,	 and	 to	 what	 effect?	 Why	 and	 how	 did	 they	
compare	 this	 model	 with	 other	 models,	 which	 one	 did	 they	 prefer,	 and	 for	 what	
reasons?	 By	 exploring	 these	 questions	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 relevant	 historical	
sources,	the	author	argues	that,	on	several	grounds,	Japan’s	initial	colonization	of	Korea	
can	be	plausibly	and	effectively	framed	as	a	subject	of	“transimperial	history”	that	takes	
seriously	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 “politics	 of	 comparison.”	 The	 article	 also	 demonstrates	
that	the	theories	and	practices	concerning	the	Egypt	model	can	be	fully	understood	only	
by	 seeing	 how	 the	 comparative	 views	 of	 the	 involved	 Japanese	 policymakers	 and	
intellectuals	were	 influenced	by	the	ways	actors	 in	other	empires—namely,	the	British	
and	 French	 empires—had	 practiced	 their	 own	 “politics	 of	 comparison”	 with	 their	
specific	motives	and	agendas.		
	
Keywords:	Korea,	Egypt,	Tunisia,	protectorate,	colonialism,	transimperial,	politics	of	
comparison,	Japanese	Empire,	British	Empire,	French	Empire,	East	Asia,	Africa		
	
Introduction	
	
On	 February	 23,	 1904,	 during	 the	 early	 days	 of	 the	 Russo-Japanese	 War,	 Japan	
concluded	 the	 Japan-Korea	 Protocol	 (also	 known	 as	 the	 Japan-Korea	 Treaty)	with	 the	
Korean	government.	Article	1	of	the	Protocol	stated	that	the	Korean	government	would	
“place	full	confidence	in	the	Imperial	Government	of	Japan	and	adopt	the	advice	of	the	
latter	 in	 regard	 to	 improvement	 in	 administration”	 (Carnegie	 Endowment	 for	
International	Peace	1921,	36).	 This	was	 the	beginning	of	 a	 three-year	period	 in	which	
Japan	 imposed	upon	Korea	a	 series	of	protectorate	 treaties,	 the	most	 important	ones	
being	 the	 First,	 Second,	 and	 Third	 Japan-Korea	 Conventions	 concluded	 in	 1904,	 1905,	
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and	1907,	 respectively.	 In	 these	years,	comparisons	between	Korea	and	other	colonial	
contexts	 in	 different	 empires	 were	 hotly	 debated.	 The	 Japanese	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	
Affairs,	 which	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 administering	 Korea	 as	 a	 protectorate,	 soon	
commissioned	a	Select	Committee	to	conduct	a	comparative	survey	of	various	colonial	
situations	 across	 the	 globe.	 Among	 these	 cases	 was	 Egypt,	 which	 had	 been	 virtually	
governed	 by	 Britain	 as	 its	 informal	 protectorate	 since	 1882.	 This	 article	 explores	 the	
emerging	comparative	scheme	during	these	years	by	foregrounding	the	place	of	Egypt	
within	that	scheme.	It	is	well	known	that	a	number	of	Japanese	concerned	with	Korean	
affairs	before	and	during	the	colonial	period	were	keenly	 interested	 in	Egypt.	Scholars	
have	noted	how,	in	such	areas	of	colonial	administration	as	policing	or	taxation,	British	
rule	 in	 Egypt	 served	 as	 a	 point	 of	 reference,	 exerting	 a	 degree	 of	 influence	 on	 the	
government	 of	 Korea	 by	 Japan.1	In	 fact,	 the	 origins	 of	 this	 comparative	 tendency,	
analogically	linking	Korea	to	Egypt,	can	be	traced	at	least	to	the	mid-1890s,	when	Inoue	
Kaoru,	 a	 Japanese	 politician	 who,	 as	 Japan’s	 Envoy	 Extraordinary	 and	 Minister	
Plenipotentiary	to	Korea,	tried	in	vain	to	“Egyptianize”	Korea	(Duus	1998,	91–97).2	This	
article	examines	the	protectorization	of	Korea	by	Japan.	Focusing	on	these	few	years	at	
the	 very	 beginning	 of	 Japan’s	 colonization	 of	 Korea,	 it	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 idea	 of	
British	rule	in	Egypt	as	a	model	of	colonial	rule	played	a	critical	role	in	the	emergence	of	
Korea	as	a	protectorate.					
This	 article	 is	part	of	 a	wider	 research	project	 in	which	 I	 rethink	 the	 colonial	 and	
anticolonial	 histories	 in	 and	 across	 two	 empires―Japanese	 and	 British―from	 the	
perspective	 of	 what	 I	 call	 “transimperial	 history.”3Transimperial	 history	 is	 a	 historio-
graphical	 framework	 that	 I	 have	been	developing	over	 the	past	 few	 years	with	Nadin	
Heé,	 Daniel	 Hedinger,	 and	 others.4	One	 of	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 quest	 for	 a	 new	
approach	 has	 been	 our	 shared	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	 “national”	 frames	 of	 historical	
analysis	that	have	characterized	conventional	historical	studies	of	colonial	empires.5	For																															 																														 			
1	On	taxation,	see	Miyajima	(1990);	on	policing,	see	Matsuda	(2000).	For	an	overview	of	the	
Japanese	view	of	Egypt	as	a	model	colony,	see	Bradshaw	and	Ndzesop	(2009,	153–157)	and	
Itagaki	(1965,	41–42).	
2	In	his	monograph,	Andre	Schmid	briefly	discusses	how	a	Korean	newspaper,	Taehan	maeil	sinbo	
(Korea	daily	news),	compared	British	rule	in	Egypt	and	Japanese	involvement	in	Korea	before	
1905.	The	Korean	nationalist	rendition	of	the	Egypt-Korea	analogy	is	an	interesting	topic,	though	
it	falls	outside	the	scope	of	this	article.	See	Schmid	(2002,	118–119).	
3	For	my	own	case	studies	in	transimperial	history	focusing	on	the	relations	between	Japanese	
and	British	colonialism,	see	Mizutani	(2014,	2015).	
4	Together	with	Daniel	Hedinger	and	Nadin	Heé,	I	co-organized	an	international	workshop,	“In-
Between	Empires:	Trans-imperial	History	in	a	Global	Age,”	held	at	Mathias	Räther,	Freie	
Universität	Berlin	on	September	15–16,	2017.	For	the	last	three	years,	I	have	led	a	JSPS	KAKENHI	
project	(grant	16H03501)	in	Japan,	conducting	research	with	Nishiyama	Akiyoshi,	Namba	Chizuru,	
Yoshida	Makoto,	Nakazato	Nariaki,	Matsuura	Masataka,	Komagome	Takeshi,	Azuma	Eiichiro,	and	
Aaron	Peters	with	a	view	to	establishing	transimperial	history	as	a	viable	field	of	study.	
5	For	historiographical	explorations	of	transimperial	history,	see	Hedinger	and	Heé	(2018)	and	
Mizutani	(2018).	For	the	case	of	the	Japanese	Empire	in	particular,	see	my	introduction	to	this	
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example,	 the	 historical	 research	 on	 the	 Japanese	 and	 British	 empires,	with	which	my	
own	project	 is	 concerned,	has	been	hindered	by	 the	 restrictions	of	 these	 frames.	One	
such	 restriction	 is	 the	 division	 and	 compartmentalization	 of	 academic	 labor	 based	 on	
national	and	linguistic	boundaries.	The	colonial	territories	in	the	Japanese	Empire―such	
as	Taiwan,	Korea,	Manchuria―and	those	in	the	British	Empire―such	as	India,	Egypt,	the	
West	 Indies,	and	Australia―have	been	extensively	studied	by	historians	specializing	 in	
either	 of	 these	 empires.	 Rarely,	 however,	 have	 they	 been	 simultaneously	 researched	
within	a	single	framework	of	analysis.	When	the	two	have	been	discussed,	the	argument	
has	 tended	 to	 become	 crudely	 comparative,	 often―if	 not	 always―based	 on	
assumptions	 of	 national	 character,	 searching	 for	 distinctive	 features	 that	 supposedly	
made	particular	policies	“Japanese”	or	“British.”6	Transimperial	history	is	anything	but	a	
mere	comparative	study	of	different	colonialisms:	it	radically	breaks	from	that	approach	
by	 foregrounding	 the	 mutual	 influences	 and	 contemporary	 interactions	 between	 the	
different	colonial	situations	unfolding	across	the	different	empires	in	question.	Working	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 new	 historiography,	 this	 article	 is	 emphatically	 not	 a	
comparative	 study	 of	 Korean	 history	 with	 Egypt	 as	 a	 frame	 of	 reference.	 Rather,	 it	
concerns	 itself	 with	 why	 and	 how	 comparisons	 with	 Egypt	 were	 drawn	 by	 those	
Japanese	who	were	variously	involved	in	the	building	of	a	colonial	protectorate	in	Korea.		
One	of	the	pillars	of	transimperial	history	is	the	study	of	what	Ann	Laura	Stoler	has	
called	 the	 “politics	of	 comparison”	 (Stoler	2001),	 and	 this	 article	 is	 a	humble	effort	 in	
that	 direction.	 A	 pioneering	 scholar	 long	 committed	 to	 colonial	 studies,	 Stoler	 has	
reminded	 us	 that	 comparisons	 as	 produced	 by	 administrators,	 intellectuals,	 and	 all	
others	involved	in	colonialism	were	seldom	neutral	or	objective.	They	were	motivated,	
consciously	 or	 not,	 by	 an	 ultimately	 political	 need	 to	 find	 out	 which	 experiences	 or	
theories	 in	 other	 empires	were	 useful	 and	worthy	 of	 being	 adopted,	 and	which	 ones	
were	misleading	 and	 should	 be	 set	 aside	 or	 used	 as	 anti-models.	 To	 understand	 this	
subjective	side	of	comparison,	we	need	to	consider	its	instances	as	acts―rather	than	as	
sources	of	objective	knowledge―and	the	people	involved	as	the	subjects	of	these	acts	
experiencing	 particular	 colonial	 situations	with	 specific	 political	 agendas	 of	 their	 own	
(Stoler	2001;	Stoler	and	McGranahan	2007).	
Following	Stoler’s	 insights,	this	article	does	not	 just	describe	Egypt	as	a	model	for	
Korea	 but	 also	 tries	 to	 reveal	 the	 motivations	 of	 those	 Japanese	 involved	 in	 the	
comparative	 debate.	 How	 did	 they	 promote―or	 oppose―this	 model,	 and	 to	 what	
effect?	Why	and	how	did	 they	compare	 this	model	with	other	models,	which	one	did	
they	prefer,	and	for	what	reasons?7																																 																														 																														 																														 																														 																					
special	issue	of	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	(https://cross-currents.	
berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-32/introduction).	
6	On	these	problems,	see,	for	example,	Komagome	(2015,	25–32).	
7	For	the	reconstruction	of	how	the	question	of	Japanese	rule	in	Korea	was	debated	during	these	
years	among	officials,	scholars,	and	journalists,	I	am	heavily	indebted	to	the	meticulous	historical	
studies	published	more	than	forty	years	ago	by	Shin’ichi	Tanaka	(1977;	1978).	My	own	work	is	
less	about	the	debate	itself	than	about	the	politics	of	comparison	involved	therein.	
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Answering	 these	 questions	 requires	 a	 close	 examination	 of	 different,	 and	 often	
conflicting,	perspectives.	Based	on	an	analysis	of	relevant	historical	sources,	this	article	
thus	 reveals	 the	 complexities	of	 Japan’s	politics	 of	 comparison.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	
Japanese	government	eventually	adopted	a	French-style	 resident-generalship	 in	Korea	
modeled	on	 the	protectorate	 in	 Tunisia.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	philosophy	of	 British	
“indirect	rule”	was	more	influential	in	terms	of	general	inspiration,	and	it	was	the	British	
Proconsul	 in	 Egypt―Lord	 Cromer―who	was	 consistently	 invoked	 as	 a	model	 colonial	
administrator	 for	 the	 Japanese	politics	of	protectorate	rule.	What	emerged	 in	 the	end	
was	 a	 hybrid	 framework	 based	 at	 least	 on	 two	 comparative	 models	 used	 as	 its	
composite	elements	(figure	1).	The	Japanese	politics	of	comparison	in	these	years	were	
complicated,	 multilayered,	 and	 even	 seemingly	 contradictory,	 defying	 any	 simplistic	
explanations	of	comparison	and	borrowing	in	terms	of	national	characterizations,	such	
as	“British”	or	“French,”	of	colonial	policy.	In	this	article,	I	argue	that	such	complexities	
reflected	the	ways	in	which	the	very	idea	of	the	colonial	protectorate	had	been,	to	some	
extent,	 a	 product	 of	 politics	 of	 comparison―politics	 that	 had	 already	 been	 played	 by	
and	among	other	empires	even	before	Japan	arrived	on	the	imperial	scene.		
	
	
	
Figure	1.	A	map	of	European	colonies	in	Africa,	including	Egypt	and	Tunisia,	that	appeared	at	the	
beginning	of	Afurika	no	zento	(The	future	of	Africa)	by	Tomizu	Hirondo	(1899).	
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The	Egypt	Model―Its	Scope	and	Limits	
	
Korea	as	“Another	Egypt	in	East	Asia”		
	
As	soon	as	the	Japan-Korea	Protocol	was	made	public	on	February	27,	1904,	there	was	
talk	in	the	Japanese	press	about	Korea	being	made	into	“another	Egypt	in	East	Asia.”	On	
March	1,	a	daily	newspaper,	Kokumin	shinbun	(The	nation),	published	a	piece	expressing	
the	need	to	find	“a	Lord	Cromer	of	our	own”	(“Tōkyōdayori”	1904).	A	month	 later,	on	
April	 1,	 another	newspaper,	 Jiji	 shinpō	 (Current	news),	 editorialized	 that	 Japan	 should	
establish	a	post	of	Sōkomon,	or	“Adviser-General,”	to	pursue	protectorate	rule	in	Korea.	
Such	a	post	would	enable	the	Japanese	representative	in	charge	to	rule	like	Lord	Cromer,	
who,	 as	 the	 British	 Proconsul,	 was	 in	 a	 position	 to	 control	 all-important	 matters	
concerning	 the	politics	and	administration	of	Egypt.	The	editorial	also	mentioned	how	
the	British	 in	Egypt	availed	themselves	of	the	post	of	a	Financial	Adviser.	As	 Jiji	shinpō	
noted,	this	adviser,	whom	Cromer	appointed	to	the	cabinet	of	the	Egyptian	government,	
had	 to	 approve	 every	 important	 decision	on	 Egypt’s	 finances	 (“Shasetsu:	 Itō	 taishi	 no	
kichō	to	chōsenkeiei”	1904).	 It	was	believed	that	the	British	“adviser”	system	with	the	
Proconsul	at	the	top	would	serve	as	a	useful	model	for	Japanese	protectorate	rule.		
In	 the	 first	 few	 months	 following	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Japan-Korea	 Protocol,	 the	
Japanese	government	was	 in	tune	with	this	 line	of	public	opinion.	A	Select	Committee	
established	 within	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 on	 March	 5,	 1904,	 asked	 Akiyama	
Masanosuke,	 	 a	 former	 official	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 now	 working	 as	 an	
official	 in	 the	army,	 to	 conduct	 a	 survey.	Akiyama	was	an	expert	on	 international	 law	
known	for	his	knowledge	on	the	subject	of	colonial	protectorates.	Within	two	months,	
he	submitted	a	report	titled,	“Hihogokoku	no	chii	ni	kansuru	gaiyō”	(The	outline	of	the	
status	of	protected	states),	in	which	he	presented	two	cases—French	rule	in	Tunisia	and	
British	 rule	 in	Egypt—as	model	examples	of	protectorate	 rule.	According	 to	Akiyama’s	
report,	the	French	protectorate	in	Tunisia	was	a	form	of	government	with	a	“Resident-
General”	as	the	effective	head	of	the	state:	
	
Any	matters	 relating	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 other	 countries	 and	
the	kingdom	of	Tunisia	are	 to	be	dealt	with	 in	 the	hands	of	France.	 In	
the	 king’s	 dynasty,	 France	 stations	 its	 representative,	 named	 the	
“Resident-General,”	who	serves	as	the	 foreign	minister	of	the	kingdom	
of	Tunis.	(Tanaka	1978,	67)	
	
Following	 his	 description	 of	 Tunisia,	 Akiyama	 moved	 on	 to	 Egypt.	 Strangely,	 he	
focused	here	on	the	“Financial	Adviser”	without	mentioning	the	Proconsul:			
	
Through	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 British	 government,	 a	 British	
Financial	Adviser	is	installed.	This	adviser	occupies	a	place	in	the	cabinet,	
and	without	his	approval,	no	matters	concerning	Egypt’s	finance	would	
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be	 ever	 decided.	 However,	 the	 same	 adviser,	 despite	 his	 place	within	
the	 cabinet,	 is	 not	 himself	 an	 administrator,	 and	 as	 such,	 there	 is	 a	
minister	 in	charge.	Egypt	 is	a	dependency	of	Turkey	only	nominally;	 in	
reality,	it	is	a	protectorate	of	Britain.	(Tanaka	1978,	68)				
	
Soon	after	Akiyama	submitted	this	report,	it	was	used	as	an	important	reference	by	
the	politicians	 in	charge,	and	 it	had	a	decisive	 impact	on	cabinet	decisions	on	May	31,	
1904,	 regarding	 Japan’s	 policy	 in	 Korea	 (Tanaka	1978,	 38–41).	One	of	 those	decisions	
was	 to	 force	 the	 Korean	 government	 into	 hiring	 two	 “advisers”:	 one	 for	 financial	
management	 and	 another	 for	 diplomatic	 affairs.8	Of	 the	 two	 models	 Akiyama	 had	
presented	 in	 his	 report,	 Egypt	 clearly	was	 one	 selected	 by	 the	 Japanese	 government.	
The	introduction	of	an	adviser	system	was	firmly	inscribed	about	three	months	later	in	
the	clauses	of	the	First	Japan-Korea	Convention,	concluded	between	the	Japanese	and	
Korean	governments	on	August	22	of	the	same	year.	The	first	two	articles	specified	the	
power	 and	 role	 of	 the	 Financial	 Adviser	 and	 the	Diplomatic	Adviser,	 respectively.	 The	
Financial	 Adviser	 is	 particularly	 interesting,	 not	 least	 because	 those	who	 advocated	 a	
British-style	adviser	system	for	Korea	tended	to	emphasize	the	 importance	of	financial	
control	in	achieving	effective	domination.	Article	1	read:	
	
The	Korean	Government	shall	engage	as	financial	adviser	to	the	Korean	
Government	 a	 Japanese	 subject	 recommended	 by	 the	 Japanese	
Government,	 and	 all	 matters	 concerning	 finance	 shall	 be	 dealt	 with	
after	his	counsel	has	been	taken.	(Carnegie	Endowment	1921,	37)	
	
If	we	compare	this	clause	with	Akiyama’s	description	of	the	adviser	system	in	Egypt,	
we	cannot	help	but	be	struck	by	their	similarities.	Without	a	doubt,	at	this	initial	stage	of	
Japan’s	effort	 to	make	Korea	 its	protectorate,	 the	 Japanese	 imperial	government	 took	
British	rule	in	Egypt	as	its	model.		
As	soon	as	 the	policy	 to	appoint	a	Financial	Adviser	was	made	public,	 there	were	
speculations	in	the	press	about	the	role	and	power	of	this	adviser.	Amano	Tameyuki,	an	
influential	 journalist	and	academic,	wrote	two	 journal	editorials	a	 few	weeks	after	 the	
First	 Convention.	 He	 saw	 Egypt	 as	 an	 exemplary	 case	 that	 proved	 how	 the	 effective	
domination	 of	 a	 state	 could	 be	 achieved	 through	 taking	 advantage	 of	 its	 financial	
difficulties.	 Amano	 expected	 the	 new	 Financial	 Adviser	 to	 the	 Korean	 government	 to	
pave	the	way	for	the	control	of	all	aspects	of	Korean	politics	and	administration,	just	as	
Evelyn	Baring	(made	Lord	Cromer	in	1892)	had	first	interfered	in	Egyptian	affairs	as	one	
of	 the	 two	 control-generals	 in	 charge	 of	managing	 the	 Egyptian	 debt	 (Amano	 1904a;	
1904b).	Finally,	on	October	16,	1904,	Megata	Tanetaro,	a	high-ranking	Japanese	official	
from	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	was	appointed	as	Financial	Adviser.	When	Megata	arrived																															 																														 			
8	Contained	in	the	following	two	cabinet	decisions	made	on	May	31,	1904:	“Teikoku	no	taikan	
hōshin”	(The	empire’s	policy	toward	Korea)	and	“Taikan	shisetsu	kōryō”	(The	institutional	
platform	for	Korea).	
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in	Korea,	he	told	Sir	John	Newell	Jordan,	the	British	Minister-Resident	 in	Korea	(1901–
1906),	 that	 Japanese	 rule	 there	 was	 being	 modeled	 on	 British	 rule	 in	 Egypt	 (FO	
Confidential	8477/16).9	In	fact,	this	was	not	merely	diplomatic	lip	service.	Once	in	Korea,	
Megata	 had	 his	 Japanese	 subordinates	 study	 the	 British	 experience	 of	 financial	
management	in	Egypt.	This	experience	included	Alfred	Milner,	who	had	served	in	Egypt	
as	the	Undersecretary	of	Finance	in	Egypt	(1890–1892).	One	of	Megata’s	subordinates,	
Inoue	Masaji,	translated	the	relevant	parts	of	Milner’s	1894	book	England	in	Egypt	into	
Japanese	(Inoue	1906).	Copies	were	circulated	among	the	officers	of	the	department	to	
be	read	as	a	reference	book	(Inoue	1928,	566)	(figure	2).		
	
	
Figure	2.	Front	page	of	the	Japanese	translation	of	Alfred	Milner’s	England	in	Egypt.	Source:	
Inoue	(1906).		
	
There	 are	 several	 reasons	 why	 many	 Japanese	 imperialists	 viewed	 Korea	 as	
analogous	 to	 Egypt.	 In	 addition	 to	 Japanese	 admiration	 at	 the	 time	 for	 British	
colonialism	in	general	and	Lord	Cromer	in	particular	(both	of	which	will	be	discussed	in	
the	 next	 section),	 a	 specific	 understanding	 of	 world	 history	 imaginatively	 connected	
Korea	 with	 Egypt.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 lengthy	 book	 titled	Hogokokukukeiei	 no	mohan:	
Ejiputo	 (Egypt	 as	 a	model	 for	 the	 administration	 of	 a	 protectorate,	 1905),	 a	 Japanese																															 																														 			
9	On	this	point,	see	also	Katayama	(2005,	14).	
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journalist	 named	 Katō	 Fusazō	 asserted	 that	 Japan’s	 coming	 to	 power	 in	 Korea	was	 a	
reenactment	of	the	same	historical	act	whereby	Britain	had	acquired	Egypt	as	its	virtual	
protectorate:	it	was	an	inevitable	manifestation	in	the	East	Asian	context	of	a	universal	
law	of	world-historical	progress.	Japan	first	claimed	its	right	over	Korea	by	undermining	
the	geopolitical	structure	of	the	premodern	Chinese	Empire.	This	process,	according	to	
Katō,	was	similar	to	how	Britain,	along	with	France,	made	its	way	into	Egypt,	which	was	
part	of	the	declining	Ottoman	Empire.	Moreover,	the	way	Japan	established	its	exclusive	
right	by	ousting	Russia	was	said	to	be	akin	to	how	Britain	made	Egypt	its	own	by	pushing	
France	away	(Katō	1905,	191–192).10		
	
The	Informal	Nature	of	British	Rule	in	Egypt	and	the	Problem	of	Applicability		
	
The	 ascendancy	 of	 the	 Egypt	 model	 was	 short-lived,	 however.	 Its	 adoption	 by	 the	
Japanese	 government	 was	 subjected	 to	 criticism	 almost	 as	 soon	 as	 it	 was	 put	 into	
practice.	 Soon	 after	 the	 press	 began	 to	 editorialize	 on	 Egypt	 in	 early	 1904,	 Tomizu	
Hirondo,	 a	 professor	 of	 law	 at	 the	 Imperial	 University	 of	 Tokyo,	 published	 a	 journal	
article	titled	“Ejiputo	to	Chōsen”	(Egypt	and	Korea),	in	which	he	criticized	the	idea	of	a	
General	 Adviser	 (which	 had	 been	 advocated	 by	 Jiji	 shinpō)	 for	 vainly	 imagining	 the	
advent	of	“a	second	Egypt	in	the	Far	East”	(Tomizu	1904a,	52).	He	was	also	against	the	
idea	of	a	Financial	Adviser.	As	soon	as	he	learned	of	the	appointment	of	Megata,	Tomizu	
published	 another	 essay	 on	 September	 6	 expressing	 his	 discontent	 over	 this	 policy,	
which	had	been	“obviously	 learned	from	a	British	policy	 in	Egypt”	(Tomizu	1904b,	48).	
Tomizu	was	not	critical	of	British	rule	in	Egypt	per	se;	rather,	he	did	not	believe	that	the	
Japanese	in	Korea	would	be	able	to	replicate	what	the	British	had	accomplished	in	Egypt.	
Tomizu	doubted	that	any	Japanese	could	adequately	perform	the	role	as	had	been	done	
by	 British	 financial	 advisers	 such	 as	 Auckland	 Colvin	 and	 Edgar	 Vincent,	 who	 were	
regarded	as	skilled	administrators	with	considerable	experience.	 In	Tomizu’s	view,	this	
problem	would	be	further	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	no	equivalent	of	the	Proconsul	
had	been	installed	in	Korea	yet.	The	adviser	system	functioned	in	Egypt,	he	pointed	out,	
only	because	the	Financial	Adviser	was	firmly	protected	by	the	all-powerful	Proconsul,	
Lord	 Cromer	 (Tomizu	 1904b,	 51).	 Because	 of	 these	 differences,	 Tomizu	 claimed,	 the	
Japanese	 Financial	 Adviser	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 control	 the	 finances	 of	 the	 Korean	
government,	 particularly	 when	 the	 Korean	 king	 was	 so	 stubbornly	 against	 financial	
reform	(Tomizu	1904b,	52–53).		
Ultimately,	Tomizu	was	against	the	Egypt	model	because	he	regarded	Korea	not	as	
a	protected	state	but	as	a	future	settler	colony	of	Japan.	To	safeguard	the	 interests	of	
Japanese	 settlers	 in	 Korea,	 nothing	 short	 of	 direct	 rule	would	 suffice,	 and	 the	 idea	of	
advisers	 being	 in	 charge	 of	 colonial	 politics	 was	 out	 of	 the	 question.	 In	 his	 eyes,	
Japanese	rule	in	Korea	shared	little	in	common	with	British	rule	in	Egypt	in	terms	of	the	
purpose	of	imperial	rule.	Uneasy	with	the	very	idea	of	a	protectorate	for	Korea,	Tomizu	
dismissed	not	 just	 the	Egypt	but	also	 the	Tunisia	model	 (Tomizu	1905).	But	 it	was	not																															 																														 			
10	On	Katō’s	comparative	view	of	Egypt	as	a	model	for	Korea,	see	Nakaoka	(1990,	361–369).	
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just	men	like	Tomizu―those	who	advocated	full	colonization―who	grew	critical	of	the	
government’s	 policy.	 Even	 among	 those	 who	 were	 not	 initially	 opposed	 to	 the	
introduction	of	 the	British-style	 adviser	 system,	 it	 did	not	 take	 long	before	a	 sense	of	
frustration	built	up.	For	example,	just	a	week	after	the	official	appointment	of	Megata,	a	
daily	newspaper,	Osaka	Asahi	shinbun	(Osaka	Asahi	news),	sharply	condemned	him	for	
taking	what	it	saw	as	far	too	lenient	a	stance	toward	the	Korean	government.	According	
to	 an	 editorial	 in	 the	 newspaper,	 Megata	 seemed	 to	 be	 serving	 more	 like	 a	 mere	
comptroller	 working	 literally	 under	 the	 Korean	 Minister	 of	 Finance.	 The	 editorial	
criticized	 Megata	 for	 not	 being	 determined	 to	 act	 as	 an	 imperial	 ruler.	Osaka	 Asahi	
shinbun	conveyed	that	this	was	not	supposed	to	be	how	Korea	should	be	governed:	an	
adviser	system	should	be	something	that	serves	Japanese	interests	by	allowing	Japanese	
advisers	to	act	above	Korean	ministers.	As	the	editorial	put	it,	by	“relinquishing	the	right	
[of	the	Japanese	Adviser]	to	act	higher	than	the	[Korean]	Minister	[of	Finance],”	Megata	
made	 “completely	 meaningless	 the	 politics	 of	 advisers.”	 The	 newspaper	 approved	
dispatching	advisers	only	insofar	as,	“despite	their	status	not	high	enough	nominally,	it	
will	 be	 made	 sure	 that	 their	 actual	 power	 will	 be	 far	 stronger	 than	 that	 of	 [Korean]	
Ministers.”	Without	this	practice,	the	editorial	asserted,	Osaka	Asahi	shinbun	would	no	
longer	 support	 the	 adviser	 system,	 advocating	 instead	 the	 introduction	 of	 governor-
generalship	(“Saigo	no	saku	wo	hodokosubeshi	[jyō]”	1904,	1).		
It	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	Osaka	Asahi	shinbun	was	opposed	to	the	idea	of	
taking	British	rule	in	Korea	as	a	model	per	se.	Rather,	the	perceived	problem	lay	in	how	
the	 introduction	 of	 the	 model	 was	 being	 put	 into	 practice.	 The	 newspaper	 was	
particularly	frustrated	with	the	alleged	looseness	with	which	the	Japanese	government	
had	applied	that	model.	What	was	nothing	less	than	a	form	of	colonial	rule	in	disguise	in	
Egypt	 seemed	 to	 have	 turned	 into	 something	much	 less	 reliable	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	
foreign	domination	in	Korea.		
Katō	Fusazō	shared	this	view.	Unlike	Osaka	Asahi	shinbun,	Katō	did	not	go	so	far	as	
to	propose	replacing	the	Egypt	model,	but	he	agreed	that	this	model	had	been	poorly	
adapted	 by	 those	 currently	 in	 charge.	 According	 to	 Katō,	 the	 Japanese	 government	
seemed	 to	 have	 taken	 the	 concept	 of	 “advice”	 far	 too	 literally,	 failing	 to	 see	 that,	 in	
Egypt,	 British	 advisers	 actually	 manipulated	 Egyptian	 ministers	 to	 the	 advantage	 of	
Britain’s	 imperial	 interests	 because	 the	 “advice”	 was,	 in	 effect,	 “orders.”	 Katō	 also	
deplored	the	fact	that	the	Japanese	adviser	system	in	Korea	lacked	an	equivalent	of	the	
Proconsul―a	 fact	 that	 further	 undermined	 an	 already	 defective	 system.	Written	with	
imperial	policymakers	 in	mind,	Katō’s	Hogokokukukeiei	no	mohan	 aimed	 to	show	why	
and	 how	 Japan	 should	 grasp	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 Egypt	model	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	
imperial	domination	in	order	to	follow	it	in	Korea	much	more	strictly.	This	point	was	all	
the	 more	 crucial	 because,	 in	 Katō’s	 teyes,	 Koreans	 were	 more	 “barbarian”	 than	
Egyptians	and	 thus	needed	 to	be	 subjected	 to	even	more	drastic	measures	of	 control	
(Katō	1905,	214–219).		
From	the	perspective	of	these	critics,	what	was	lacking	in	Korea	was	a	full-fledged	
transplantation	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 power	 that	 existed	 in	 Egypt,	 supporting,	 albeit	
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covertly,	 the	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	 the	 British	 adviser	 system.	 Certainly,	 British	 rule	
had	 started	 as	 a	 military	 occupation	 with	 no	 initial	 intention	 of	 imposing	 durable	
colonial	 rule.	 At	 least	 initially,	 the	 plan	was	 to	 end	 the	 occupation	 in	 the	 foreseeable	
future	 with	 troops	 withdrawn	 whenever	 appropriate.	 Officially,	 it	 was	 not	 even	 a	
protectorate,11	and	on	 the	surface,	 it	was	 local,	 rather	 than	British,	 rulers	and	officials	
who	ran	the	Egyptian	administration.	However,	the	British	government	made	sure	that	
the	 Viceroy	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire―the	 Khedive―and	 the	 Egyptian	Ministers	 under	
him	were	 obliged	 to	 follow	 the	 “advice”	 given	 by	 the	 British.	 Indeed,	 Katō	 	 correctly	
pointed	out	that	this	“advice”	was	effectively	an	“order.”	On	January	4,	1884,	the	British	
Foreign	Secretary,	Lord	Granville,	sent	a	confidential	telegram	message	to	Lord	Cromer	
(then	Evelyn	Baring),	making	it	clear	that:		
	
In	 important	 questions,	 where	 the	 administration	 and	 safety	 of	 Egypt	
are	at	stake,	it	 is	indispensable	that	Her	Majesty’s	Government	should,	
as	 long	as	 the	provisional	occupation	of	 the	 country	by	English	 troops	
continues,	be	assured	that	the	advice	which,	after	full	consideration	of	
the	 views	 of	 the	 Egyptian	Government,	 they	may	 feel	 it	 their	 duty	 to	
tender	 to	 the	Khedive,	 should	be	 followed.	 It	 should	be	made	clear	 to	
the	 Egyptian	 Ministers	 and	 Governors	 of	 provinces	 that	 the	
responsibility	which	for	the	time	rests	on	England	obliges	Her	Majesty’s	
Government	 to	 insist	 on	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 policy	 which	 they	
recommend,	 and	 that	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 that	 those	 Ministers	 and	
Governors	 who	 do	 not	 follow	 this	 course	 should	 cease	 to	 hold	 their	
offices.	(Great	Britain.	Foreign	Office	1884,	176)	
			
By	 giving	 the	 British	 authorities	 the	 right	 to	 dismiss	 disobedient	 Egyptian	
administrators,	this	“Granville	Doctrine”―officially	expressed	 in	the	foreign	secretary’s	
circular	 of	 January	 3,	 1883	 (Granville	 1956)―made	 the	 adviser	 system	 a	 colonial	
apparatus	of	power.	 Japanese	advocates	of	 the	Egypt	model	expected	this	doctrine	to	
be	 applied	 to	 the	 newly	 introduced	 system	 in	 Korea	 only	 to	 find	 that,	much	 to	 their	
frustration,	it	did	not	seem	to	have	been	applied	as	strictly	as	they	deemed	necessary.		
	
Legalist	Objections	and	the	French	Protectorate	of	Tunisia	as	Another	Model			
	
Amid	mounting	 criticism	against	 the	 tactless	 application	of	 the	British	 adviser	 system,	
the	 Japanese	 government	 searched	 for	 a	 new	 model,	 with	 the	 Select	 Committee	
continuing	 its	comparative	research	on	various	protectorates	across	different	empires.	
By	the	fall	of	1905,	the	government	reversed	its	former	policy	of	modeling	Japanese	rule	
in	 Korea	 on	 the	 British	 adviser	 system	 in	 Egypt.	 Based	 on	 a	 report	 of	 the	 Select	
Committee,	 the	 cabinet	 decided	 to	 adopt	 resident-generalship	 as	 the	 administrative																															 																														 			
11	It	became	a	formal	protectorate	only	in	1914	as	a	result	of	Britain’s	declaration	of	war	against	
the	Ottoman	Empire,	of	which	Egypt	had	been	a	part,	if	only	nominally.	
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structure	 for	 Korea.12	Korea	 would	 continue	 to	 be	 ruled	 as	 a	 protectorate	 under	 the	
control	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	and	the	Japanese	representative	there	would	
serve	as	a	“Resident-General.”	Three	weeks	 later,	on	November	17,	Japan	 imposed	on	
the	 Korean	 government	 the	 Second	 Japan-Korea	 Convention,	 whose	 article	 3	 stated,	
“The	Government	of	Japan	shall	be	represented	at	the	Court	of	His	Majesty	the	Emperor	
of	Korea	by	a	Resident-General”	(Carnegie	Endowment	1921,	55).	After	about	a	year	and	
a	 half,	 on	 July	 24,	 1907,	 the	 Third	 Japan-Korea	 Convention	 concluded.	 Its	 first	 article	
read,	“The	Government	of	Korea	shall	 follow	the	directions	of	 the	Resident-General	 in	
connection	 with	 the	 reform	 of	 administration”	 (Carnegie	 Endowment	 1921,	 58).	
Through	these	clauses,	the	Japanese	Resident-General	was	formally	entrusted	with	the	
power	to	control	both	the	internal	and	diplomatic	affairs	of	the	Korean	government.		
These	 developments	 in	 the	 latter	 phase	 of	 Japan’s	 efforts	 to	 make	 Korea	 its	
protectorate	 represented	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 initial	 decision	 that	 had	 favored	 the	 Egypt	
model	over	that	of	Tunisia.	That	French	rule	in	Tunisia	was	taken	as	the	new	model	can	
be	partly	seen	by	the	fact	that,	as	the	historian	Arai	Shin’ichi	points	out,	we	can	observe	
striking	similarities	between	the	new	Japan-Korea	Conventions	and	the	two	treaties	that	
France	 imposed	on	the	Tunisian	government	 in	the	early	1880s,	namely,	 the	Treaty	of	
Bardo	(May	12,	1881)	and	the	La	Marsa	Convention	(June	8,	1883).13		
Why	 and	 how	 was	 the	 Egypt	 model	 dropped	 by	 the	 foreign	 ministry’s	 Select	
Committee?	 What	 was	 the	 perceived	 difference	 from	 the	 Tunisia	 model	 that	
contributed	 to	 this	 crucial	 change?	 To	 answer	 these	 questions,	we	must	 consider	 the	
views	of	Tachi	Sakutarō,	a	prominent	professor	of	law	at	Tokyo	Imperial	University	who	
played	a	crucial	role	in	this	shift	in	comparative	thinking.	Invited	by	the	government	to	
be	 a	member	 of	 the	 Select	 Committee,	 he	 served	 throughout	 its	 duration.	 It	was	 his	
report,	Hogokoku	nikansuru	torishirabe	(An	investigation	of	protectorates),	―submitted	
sometime	between	April	and	July	1905―that	had	an	irrevocable	impact	on	the	last	two	
protectorate	 treaties	 between	 Japan	 and	 Korea	 (Tanaka	 1977,	 59–63).	 As	 Tachi	
admitted,	his	comparative	study	was	not	purely	academic:	it	was	inherently	political	as	
well	 as	 pragmatic,	 concerned	 ultimately	 with	 the	 question	 of	 how	 Korea	 could	 be	
transformed	into	a	more	fully	controlled	protectorate	than	the	one	specified	in	1904	by	
the	 First	 Japan-Korea	 Convention.14	Why	 and	 how	 did	 the	 Egypt	 model	 lose	 favor	 in																															 																														 			
12	The	cabinet	decision	on	October	27,	1905:	“Kankokuhogokenkakuritsujikkō	ni	kansuru	
kakugikettei	no	ken”	(On	the	cabinet’s	decision	on	establishing	and	exercising	the	right	of	
controlling	Korea	as	a	protectorate).	
13	Articles	1	and	2	of	the	Second	Japan-Korea	Convention	of	1905	are	similar	to	article	6	of	the	
Treaty	of	Bardo.	In	the	same	way,	articles	2,	3,	4,	and	5	of	the	former	are	similar	to	articles	4,	5,	1,	
3	of	the	latter	(Arai	2008,	240).	
14	Tachi’s	imperialist	stance	is	well	articulated	in	his	critique	of	Ariga	Nagao	―one	of	the	most	
prominent	legal	scholars	in	Japan	at	the	time.	In	his	1906	book,	Hogokoku	ron	(A	treatise	on	the	
protectorate),	Ariga	classified	the	status	of	Korea	as	a	protected	state	as	hanging	somewhere	
between	independence	and	subjugation.	Tachi	criticized	this	as	an	idle	academic	talk	at	best,	
allegedly	divorced	from	the	realities	of	East	Asia	and	the	concurrent	imperialist	condition	of	the	
world	at	large.	Contrary	to	Ariga,	Tachi	recognized	no	possibility	for	Korean	sovereignty	
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Tachi’s	scheme,	giving	way	to	another	model?	What	politics	of	colonial	comparison	lay	
behind	his	dismissal	of	the	Egypt	model?					
Tachi’s	1905	report	was	devoted	almost	exclusively	to	descriptions	and	analyses	of	
French	 protectorates,	 past	 and	 present,	 with	 Tunisia	 figuring	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	examples.	Although	some	British	protectorates,	such	as	the	Transvaal,	were	
mentioned,	 Egypt	 was	 not	 identified	 as	 an	 example	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 model	
(Hogokoku	nikansuru	torishirabe	1905).	What,	then,	was	Tachi’s	view	of	Egypt?	We	find	
the	answer	in	Tachi’s	“Hogokoku	ron”	(A	treatise	on	the	protectorate),	a	journal	article	
published	 in	August	1905,	soon	after	 the	publication	of	his	 report	and	several	months	
before	the	Second	Convention.	Tachi	did	not	argue	that	the	British	enterprise	 in	Egypt	
was	 a	 failure.	 Rather,	 he	 emphasized	 how,	 through	 the	 Granville	 Doctrine,	 the	
administration	 of	 Egypt	 had	 been	 as	 stringently	 controlled	 as	 possible,	 despite	 the	
seeming	autonomy	of	the	Khedive	(Tachi	1905,	66–67).	There	was	no	doubt	that,	as	a	
de-facto	protectorate,	Egypt	was	a	successful	case.	However,	Tachi	was	a	 legal	expert,	
and	in	the	context	of	Japanese	rule	in	Korea	he	wanted	to	find	emulative	cases	in	which	
the	nature	of	protectorate	rule	was	defined	by	formal	treaty	arrangements	in	terms	that	
were	recognizable	by	the	norms	of	“international	law.”	Starting	as	a	military	conquest,	
and	gradually	turning	into	an	informal	protectorate,	British	rule	in	Egypt	lacked	a	clear	
legal	 definition	 that	 could	 be	 compared	with	 the	 situation	 in	 Korea,	 in	 which	 several	
treaties	 had	 already	 been	 concluded.	 Except	 for	 the	 British	 foreign	minister’s	 circular	
addressed	to	the	Powers,	which	was	not	a	treaty	between	Britain	and	Egypt,	there	was	
nothing	that	legally	specified	Egypt’s	international	status.	Nor	was	the	Granville	Doctrine	
concerning	 the	 control	 of	 Egyptian	 high	 officials	 regarded	 as	 a	 formal	 arrangement	
sanctioned	by	law:	it	was	more	a	policy	directive	than	an	internationally	recognized	legal	
clause.	For	Tachi,	this	absence	of	formal	legal	arrangements	was	the	primary	factor	that	
disqualified	the	British	adviser	system	in	Egypt	as	a	model.		
Despite	Tachi’s	eventual	dismissal	of	the	Egypt	model,	it	had	a	specific	value	for	his	
politics	 of	 colonial	 comparison.	 In	 citing	 it	 as	 an	 anti-model,	 he	 was	 trying	 to	
demonstrate	how	the	rulers	of	a	protectorate	without	formal	legal	arrangements	might	
suffer	otherwise	avoidable	setbacks.	Comparison	was	a	useful	strategy,	but	seeing	Korea	
as	analogous	to	Egypt	was	a	misguided	use	of	it	and	threatened	to	compromise	Japan’s	
interests	as	a	colonizing	power.	To	make	his	point,	Tachi	alluded	to	a	particular	passage	
of	Milner’s	England	in	Egypt.	In	this	enormously	influential	book,	Milner	glorified	British	
rule,	 enumerating	 its	 achievements.	 In	 the	 particular	 pages	 to	 which	 Tachi	 alluded,	
however,	Milner	disclosed	a	sense	of	frustration	with	the	inconveniences	brought	about	
by	the	informal	nature	of	British	protectorate	rule.	He	wrote:			
	
																															 																														 																														 																														 																														 																					
whatsoever,	arguing	that	the	protectorate	must	be	seen	as	an	instrument	that	would	enable	
Japan	to	hold	Korea	in	the	age	of	imperialism	(Tachi	1906,	35–37).	For	discussion	of	Ariga’s	view	
on	Korea	as	a	protectorate	and	his	debate	with	Tachi,	see	Dudden	(2005,	63–67)	and	Yamamoto	
(1992,	18–24).	
Satoshi	Mizutani	
Cross-Currents	32	|	34	
Thus	 we	 did	 after	 all	 establish	 a	 Protectorate	 in	 Egypt,	 but	 not	 a	
complete	 or	 legitimate	 one.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 was	 a	 Protectorate	
which	we	would	not	avow	ourselves,	and	therefore	could	not	call	upon	
others	to	recognize.	It	was	a	veiled	Protectorate	of	uncertain	extent	and	
indefinite	 duration	 for	 the	 accomplishment	 of	 a	 difficult	 and	 distant	
object.…It	 is	 far	 from	 being	my	 intention	 to	 criticize	 this	 policy,	much	
less	to	condemn	it.…All	I	wish	to	point	out	now	is,	how	the	attainment	
of	our	object	of	setting	up	a	stable	order	of	things—complicated	enough	
in	 any	 case—was	 rendered	 enormously	 more	 complicated	 by	 our	
preference	 for	 an	 incomplete	and	 informal	over	a	 thorough-going	and	
proclaimed	 Protectorate.	 (Milner	 1894,	 34–35;	 mentioned	 in	 Tachi	
[1905,	66])	
	
By	drawing	on	Milner’s	discontent,	Tachi	exercised	a	twofold	point	in	his	politics	of	
colonial	 comparison.	 First,	 he	made	 it	 clear	 that	 Japanese	 rule	 in	 Korea	 could	 not	 be	
compared	with	 British	 rule	 in	 Egypt	 because	 the	 former,	 unlike	 the	 latter,	 is	 actually	
founded	in	international	law.	Citing	the	view	of	Thomas	Joseph	Lawrence,	a	British	legal	
scholar,	 Tachi	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 internationally	 recognized	 that	 Korea	 had	 formally	
come	 under	 the	 protection	 of	 Japan	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 1904	 Japan-Korea	 Protocol	
(Lawrence	 1904,	 269–285;	 cited	 in	 Tachi	 1905,	 34–35).	 This	 being	 said,	 however,	 the	
terms	 of	 the	 First	 Convention	 that	 followed	 the	 Protocol	 some	 months	 later	 were	
nowhere	near	sufficient	in	completely	subjugating	Korea	under	Japanese	control.	After	
all,	 Japan	 would	 still	 need	 to	 work	 on	 the	 international	 status	 of	 Korea	 by	 imposing	
another	 set	 of	 treaties.	 Thus,	 by	 showing	 Milner’s	 dissatisfaction	 and	 anxiety,	 the	
second	point	of	Tachi’s	politics	of	comparison	was	to	show	that	Japanese	rule	in	Korea	
was	 not	 free	 of	 possible	 dangers	 arising	 from	 definitional	 ambiguity.	 The	 Japanese	
government,	 he	 argued,	 must	 overcome	 the	 incompleteness	 of	 the	 current	
arrangements,	partly	caused	by	the	decision	to	adopt	Egypt’s	adviser	system	as	a	model.		
If	British	rule	in	Egypt	was	unsuitable	as	a	model	because	of	a	lack	of	legal	sanction,	
French	 rule	 in	 Tunisia	 was	 suitable	 for	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 reason.	 After	 invading	
Tunisia,	 France	 imposed	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Bardo.	 This	 treaty,	 however,	 was	 found	
insufficient	 in	 guaranteeing	 France	 full	 sovereignty	 over	 Tunisia,	 as	 it	 had	 implicitly	
acknowledged,	 for	 example,	 the	domestic	 sovereignty	of	 the	 local	 Tunisian	 ruler―the	
Bay.	 In	order	 to	augment	 its	colonial	domination,	France	tackled	the	perceived	 lack	of	
power	by	imposing	additional	treaties	in	subsequent	years.	In	1883,	for	example,	France	
concluded	with	 Tunisia	 the	 La	Marsa	 Convention,	 demanding	 that	 the	 Bay	make	 any	
reforms	 that	 the	French	authorities	deemed	necessary	 (Lewis	2014,	22–23,	105,	166).	
The	very	method	that	France	implemented	to	rectify	its	initial	lack	of	full	domination—
concluding	 additional	 treaties—was	 inspirational	 for	 Japanese	 legal	 experts	 like	 Tachi,	
who	felt	that	Japan’s	protectorate	rule	in	Korea	as	specified	by	the	First	Convention	was	
not	stringent	enough	to	secure	Japan’s	effective	sovereignty.		
	
Transimperial	Genealogies	of	Korea	as	a	Protectorate	
Cross-Currents	32	|	35	
The	system	of	protectorate	rule	that	eventually	emerged	in	Tunisia	was	attractive	
to	Tachi	for	several	reasons.	First,	unlike	the	British	Proconsul	in	Egypt,	the	positions	of	
the	 French	 Resident-General	 and	 the	 French	 officials	 who	 worked	 under	 him	 were	
guaranteed	by	 law.	As	Tachi	noted	 in	his	1905	report,	article	5	of	 the	Treaty	of	Bardo	
defined	the	French	representative	as	a	Minister-Resident	(ministre	résident)	only	to	be	
later	 renamed	 Resident-General	 (résident	 général)	 on	 June	 23,	 1885	 (Hogokoku	
nikansuru	torishirabe	1905,	slide	no.	0512)	(figure	3).		
	
	
	
Figure	3.	The	section	of	Tachi	Sakutarō’s	report	where	he	mentions	the	“résident	général”	in	
Tunisia.	Source:	Hogokoku	nikansuru	torishirabe	(1905,	slide	no.	0512).	
	
This	precedent	gave	Tachi	a	comparative	 framework	 for	prescribing	 the	power	of	
the	 future	Japanese	Resident-General	 in	Korea.	Furthermore,	 in	addition	to	the	 legally	
sanctioned	 installation	 of	 a	 Resident-General,	 the	 French	 in	 Tunisia	 seemed	 to	 have	
more	 power	 than	 the	 British	 in	 Egypt	 to	 influence	 the	 internal	 administration	 of	 the	
protectorate.	 With	 his	 imperialist	 belief	 that	 it	 was	 the	 self-interest	 of	 the	 colonial	
powers	 that	 made	 the	 protectorate	 a	 popular	 choice―a	 belief	 that	 reflected	 the	
imperialistic	 view	 held	 by	 many	 Western	 scholars	 of	 international	 law	 at	 the	
time15―Tachi’s	comparative	survey	of	protectorates	necessarily	entailed	an	assessment	
of	how	far	and	in	what	ways	the	protecting	state	would	be	able	to	control	the	domestic	
affair	 of	 the	 protected	 state.	 The	 Tunisia	 model	 fared	 prominently	 in	 his	 scheme																															 																														 			
15	As	Emmanuelle	Tourme-Jouannet	points	out,	the	liberal	credentials	of	international	
law―characterized	by	neutrality,	equality,	and	freedom―disappeared	into	thin	air	once	they	
entered	colonial	contexts.	The	legal	relations	that	Europe	imposed	on	the	rest	of	the	world	
justified	inequality	and	dependence,	and	colonial	protectorates	were	one	such	legal	construct	
(Tourme-Jouannet	2014,	17–21).	
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because,	as	he	noted	in	an	article	published	in	September	1907,	it	was	the	most	notable	
case	in	which	nationals	from	the	protecting	state	were	appointed	to	the	highest	posts	of	
the	protected	state,	actually	occupying	ministerial	positions,	rather	than	merely	serving	
as	“advisers.”	Not	only	was	the	Prime	Minister-cum-Foreign	Minister	French;	seven	out	
of	the	nine	members	of	the	cabinet	were	as	well	(Tachi	1907,	51).		
Tachi	 did	 not	 regard	 British	 rule	 in	 Egypt,	 widely	 regarded	 as	 an	 eminently	
successful	example	of	foreign	domination,	as	being	any	less	successful	than	French	rule	
in	Tunisia.	For	him,	the	problem	was	that	its	success	seemed	to	depend	heavily	on	the	
tact	 and	 charisma	of	 certain	experienced	administrators,	 Lord	Cromer	being	 the	most	
prominent	 example.	 Tachi	 did	 not	 see	 this	 reliance	 as	 an	 appropriate	 model	 for	
Japanese	 rule	 in	 Korea.	 A	 “veiled	 protectorate”	 could	 hardly	 be	 a	 model	 for	 a	 new	
empire	 like	 Japan,	 whose	 colonial	 administrators	 inevitably	 lacked	 experience.	 Tachi	
wanted	 something	 more	 formal	 both	 legally	 and	 institutionally,	 precisely	 what	 the	
Tunisia	model	offered.		
	
The	Institution	of	the	Colonial	Protectorate	and	Its	Transimperial	Genealogies	
	
British	Influence	on	French	Protectorate	Rule	and	the	Japanese	Politics	of	Comparison				
	
The	Japanese	government	eventually	chose	Tunisia	over	Egypt	as	an	institutional	model	
for	Japan’s	protectorate	rule	in	Korea,	but	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section,	Egypt	
continued	to	be	relevant	for	Japanese	rule	in	Korea.	The	adoption	of	the	Tunisia	model	
should	 not	 mislead	 us	 into	 thinking	 that	 French	 colonialism	 was	 somehow	 preferred	
over	 its	 British	 counterpart.	 The	 Japanese	 politics	 of	 comparison	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	
century	was	more	 subtle	 and	 complicated	 than	 that,	 as	 can	be	 seen	by	 exploring	 the	
comparative	 colonial	 thought	 entertained	 by	 the	 historian	 and	 politician	 Takekoshi	
Yosaburō.	The	most	important	reason	is	that	his	writings	reflected	the	sharp	awareness	
among	 Japanese	 theorists	 at	 the	 time	 that	 the	 very	 idea	 and	practice	of	 protectorate	
rule	 had	 transimperial	 dimensions	 and	 were	 irreducible	 to	 such	 national	
characterizations	 as	 “French”	 or	 “British.”	 Another	 reason	 is	 that	 on	 the	 question	 of	
Korea,	 he	 was	 an	 advocate	 of	 Tunisia―not	 Egypt,	 which	 he	 did	 not	 count	 as	 a	
protectorate―as	 a	model	 (Takekoshi	 1906a,	 126–127),	making	 his	 perspective	 almost	
exactly	 the	 same	 as	 Tachi	 Sakutarō’s,	 and,	 by	 extension,	 that	 of	 the	 Japanese	
government.	 Exploration	 of	 Takekoshi’s	 politics	 of	 comparison,	 therefore,	 can	 help	 us	
better	understand	the	perceived	differences	between	the	two	models	and	the	reasons	
why	one	was	preferred	over	the	other	as	an	applicable	model	for	legal	and	institutional	
systematization.	At	the	same	time,	it	has	the	benefit	of	giving	us	a	broader	picture	of	the	
Japanese	 comparative	 scheme	 because,	 whereas	 Tachi’s	 writings	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	
matters	 of	 law,	 Takekoshi’s	 comparative	 arguments	 concerned	 colonial	 policy	 more	
generally.		
Takekoshi	 was	 known	 as	 an	 expert	 on	 colonial	 affairs.	 His	 publications	 included	
Hikakushokumindeido	 (A	 comparative	 study	 of	 colonial	 systems,	 1906),	 a	 substantial	
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portion	 of	which	was	 devoted	 to	 a	 discussion	 of	 different	 protectorates	 as	 a	modern	
colonial	institution,	including	Tunisia	(Takekoshi	1906a,	126–127).	An	enthusiast	for	the	
Japanese	use	of	protectorate	rule	he	regarded	the	 idea	of	annexing	Korea	as	“absurd”	
(Takekoshi	 1906b,	 64).	 He	 saw	 the	 use	 of	 the	 protectorate	 as	 more	 suitable	 and	
advantageous	than	full	colonization	given	the	contemporary	state	of	imperialism	in	the	
world	 (Takekoshi	 1904,	 61).	 When	 the	 process	 of	 colonization	 began,	 Takekoshi	
expected	the	Japanese	in	Korea	to	establish	a	well-organized	protectorate,	but	the	First	
Japan-Korea	Convention	worried	him	greatly	because	of	its	perceived	incompleteness	in	
fully	making	Korea	a	protectorate.	In	an	article	aptly	titled	“Chōsen	niokeru	hanjyōrakka	
no	 seisaku”	 (A	 half-baked	 policy	 in	 Korea),	 published	 on	 November	 1,	 1904―three	
months	 after	 the	 First	 Convention―Takekoshi	 expressed	 his	 disappointment,	 saying	
that	the	current	state	of	Korea	was	nowhere	near	that	of	Tunisia,	which	he	regarded	as	
a	 genuine	 protectorate.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 First	 Convention	was	 not	 clear	 enough	 about	
Japan’s	right	to	dictate	the	diplomatic	affairs	of	Korea,	leaving	room	for	other	powers	to	
conclude	treaties	with	the	latter.	This	situation	contrasted	sharply	with	the	emergence	
of	 Tunisia	 as	 a	 protectorate,	 when	 France	 immediately	 declared	 to	 Italy	 and	 other	
interested	 countries	 that	 their	 former	 treaties	with	 Tunisia	were	 no	 longer	 valid	 now	
that	 France	 controlled	 its	 diplomacy	 (Takekoshi	 1904,	 61).	 Takekoshi	 lamented	 that,	
though	the	Japanese	government	had	once	studied	Tunisia,	it	failed	to	use	it	as	a	model,	
preferring	 the	 British	 adviser	 system.	 He	 argued	 that	 the	 government	 should	 have	
followed	the	Tunisia	model	from	the	beginning,	making	the	Japanese	representative	in	
Seoul	 the	 foreign	minister	of	 the	Korean	government	 rather	 than	merely	 its	 “adviser”	
(Takekoshi	 1904,	 62).	 As	 an	 enthusiastic	 proponent	 of	 introducing	 the	 Tunisia	model,	
Takekoshi	was	pleased	that,	following	the	comparative	survey	by	the	Select	Committee,	
Japan	imposed	a	French-style	resident-generalship	on	Korea	in	1905	(Takekoshi	1906b,	
63).	 In	 his	 view,	 it	 was	 the	 French	 who	 first	 started	 to	 use	 the	 protectorate	 in	 an	
admirable	and	exemplary	way.		
It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	Takekoshi	qualified	this	view	by	adding	that,	
when	 seen	 genealogically,	 the	 salience	 of	 the	 protectorate	 as	 a	 new	 instrument	 of	
colonial	expansion	could	not	be	attributed	to	the	French	alone.	That	is,	when	examined	
carefully	 in	 terms	of	 its	origins	and	historical	evolution,	 the	protectorate	could	not	be	
understood	without	taking	into	consideration	the	influence	of	British	colonialism.	In	an	
article	published	in	1906,	he	wrote:			
	
France	was	the	country	that	discovered	the	value	of	the	protectorate	as	
a	system,	but	it	was	Britain	that	had	long	practiced	the	principle	of	non-
intervention,	 which	 is	 the	 very	 essence	 of	 that	 system.	 British	
colonialism	has	been	successful	because	it	has	done	its	utmost	in	trying	
not	 to	 destroy	 traditional	 customs,	 not	 to	 replace	 native	 officials,	 and	
not	to	increase	the	costs	of	administration.…It	is	in	the	British	style	that	I	
would	like	our	country	to	practice	its	colonial	rule	(Takekoshi	1906b,	65;	
emphasis	added).		
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Takekoshi	thought	it	crucial	that	Japanese	rule	in	Korea	adopt	a	non-assimilationist	
colonial	 policy	 based	 on	 cautious	 utilization	 of	 local	 traditions	 and	 customs,	 a	 policy	
originally	attributed	to	the	British	rather	than	the	French.	He	categorically	opposed	the	
idea	of	assimilating	Koreans	 into	Japanese	political	 institutions	and	cultural	values	and	
was	a	leading	critic	of	Japan’s	adoption	of	dokashugi	(assimilationism),	a	colonial	policy	
most	ardently	promoted	by	France.	He	saw	it	as	an	ineffectual	and	dangerous	approach	
based	 on	 the	 universalistic	 imposition	 of	 one’s	 own	 ways.	 If	 the	 French	 were	 at	 all	
worthy	 of	 praise,	 it	 was	 precisely	 because	 of	 their	 recent	 shift	 away	 from	
assimilationism	 toward	 protectorate	 rule:	 in	 Takekoshi’s	 words,	 such	 a	 shift	 was	
“nothing	but	an	attempt	to	make	British	what	used	to	be	the	French	way	of	colonialism”	
(Takekoshi	1906a,	119).		
	
Transimperial	Trajectories	of	the	Evolution	of	Protectorates	across	the	Globe								
	
Our	 examination	 of	 Takekoshi	 Yozaburō’s	 politics	 of	 comparison	 reveals	 not	 just	 the	
influence	of	past	experiences	 in	other	empires	on	 the	 formations	of	 Japanese	colonial	
policy	 but	 also	 the	 significance	 of	 comparison	 for	 those	 very	 empires	 from	 whose	
experiences	 Japanese	 theorists	 and	 policymakers	 tried	 to	 draw	 object	 lessons.	
Takekoshi’s	 view	 sharply	 reflected	 the	 prevalence	 of	 colonial	 comparisons	 the	 world	
over.	 Anticolonial	 movements	 had	 been	 on	 the	 rise	 since	 the	 closing	 decades	 of	 the	
nineteenth	century,	and	different	colonial	powers	looked	to	one	another	in	their	efforts	
to	find	new	ways	to	circumvent	the	problems	they	were	commonly	facing.	By	the	time	
Takekoshi	 penned	 his	 writings	 on	 Korea,	 the	 institution	 of	 the	 protectorate	 had	
emerged	 out	 of	 such	 historical	 circumstances,	 having	 been	 used	 in	 various	 colonial	
empires.	 Its	 perceived	 usefulness	 only	 increased	with	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 scramble	 for	
Africa―whose	climax	was	marked	by	the	Berlin	Conference	of	1884–1885―when	new	
territories	 were	 acquired	 by	 competing	 European	 powers	 on	 a	 first-come-first-served	
basis.	As	 scholars	of	 international	 law	 such	as	Antony	Anghie	and	Martti	 Koskenniemi	
have	point	out,	protectorate	rule	was	not	 intended	to	be	a	 lesser	 form	of	colonialism.	
Rather,	it	was	conceived	of	as	a	flexible	means	for	the	colonizing	forces	to	acquire	and	
then	 control	 newly	 acquired	 territories	 without	 the	 potential	 risks,	 burdens,	 and	
criticisms	 that	 came	 with	 more	 explicit	 forms	 of	 conquest	 and	 domination.	 The	
protectorate	was	not	a	poor	 substitute	 for	a	 colony;	ultimately,	 for	good	 reasons,	 the	
distinction	between	protectorates	and	colonies	was	highly	equivocal	(Anghie	2005,	67–
90;	Koskenniemi	2001,	124–125).		
The	 evolution	 of	 the	 protectorate	 as	 a	 colonial	 system	 had	 a	 lot	 to	 do	 with	 a	
particular	 shift	 in	 colonial	policy	 across	empires.	 Into	 the	 late	nineteenth	 century,	 the	
two	dominant	modern	empires,	the	British	and	French,	were	not	always	confident	about	
their	 own	 strategies	 of	 rule.	 Britain	 faced	 a	major	 revolt	 in	 India,	 and	 French	 rule	 in	
Algeria	was	far	from	secure.	These	empires	searched	for	new	strategies	and	by	the	last	
few	decades	of	 the	century,	 there	was	a	turn	against	colonial	 liberalism	 in	the	case	of	
the	 British	 and	 against	 assimilationism	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 French.	 As	 historian	 Karuna	
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Mantena	 has	 demonstrated	 in	Alibis	 of	 Empire:	 Henry	Maine	 and	 the	 Ends	 of	 Liberal	
Imperialism	 (2010),	 the	 kind	of	 liberalism	 flourishing	 in	 the	British	Raj	 during	 the	 first	
half	of	 the	nineteenth	century―epitomized	by	 the	policy	of	 “English	education”―was	
criticized	after	the	Great	Revolt	of	1857,	giving	rise	to	a	new	conservative	approach	to	
colonialism	 that	emphasized	a	 strategic	use	of	what	were	 regarded	as	 Indian	customs	
and	 traditions.	 This	 approach	 is	 widely	 known	 as	 “indirect	 rule,”	 a	 term	 coined	 by	
Frederick	Lugard,	a	British	soldier	and	administrator	who	systematized	this	form	of	rule	
in	 the	 context	 of	 British	 rule	 in	 Nigeria	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century.	 Historically,	
however,	it	can	be	traced	to	British	jurist	Henry	Maine’s	thought	on	Indian	society	and	
its	application	 in	 the	 Indian	context	by	such	powerful	British	 rulers	as	Alfred	Lyall	and	
John	 Strachey.	 Actually,	 Lord	 Cromer,	 with	 his	 prior	 experience	 in	 India,	 was	 one	 of	
those	British	imperialists	who	were	well-versed	in	this	school	of	thought	and	applied	it	
to	a	non-Indian	context:	Egypt	as	the	“veiled	protectorate”	was	one	ground	where	the	
new	approach	was	consciously	applied.16		
The	 transimperial	 dimension	 of	 this	 spread	 of	 British	 indirect	 rule	 is	 of	 crucial	
importance	 for	 our	 discussion.	 Its	 influence	 as	 a	 new	 theory	 of	 colonialism	 was	 not	
confined	to	the	British	Empire:	among	other	things,	 it	deeply	affected	the	French	turn	
against	 their	 own	 policy	 of	 assimilationism	 toward	 a	 new	 approach	 called	
“associationism.”	To	a	great	degree,	French	associationism	was	a	product	of	politics	of	
comparison	 with	 British	 rule	 in	 India	 as	 a	 critical	 reference	 point.	 Influential	 French	
theorists	of	 colonialism,	 such	as	Gustave	 Le	Bon,	 Jules	Harmand,	 and	 Joseph	Chailley-
Bert,	were	highly	aware	of	the	work	of	their	British	contemporaries,	including	Strachey	
and	Lyall	(Mizutani	2014,	435–441).		
It	is	crucial	to	note	that	the	protectorate	was	an	incrementally	important	mode	of	
indirect	rule.	Because	British	indirect	rule	had	significantly	inspired	the	very	formulation	
of	 French	 associationism,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	 that	 France’s	 new	 colonial	 policy	 relied	
extensively	on	the	protectorate	as	a	form	of	indirect	rule.	Raymond	Betts,	a	historian	of	
colonialism,	 reminds	us	 that	 in	 this	 context	 the	 rule	of	 the	protectorate	 in	 the	French	
Empire	 was	 often	 synonymous	 with	 the	 practice	 of	 associationism	 (Betts	 2005,	 131).	
Thus,	 it	would	not	be	an	exaggeration	to	say	that,	genealogically	speaking	at	least,	the	
French	use	of	protectorate	rule	in	Tunisia	was	influenced	by	British	indirect	rule.		
Importantly	 for	 our	 discussion,	 some	 influential	 Japanese	 theorists	 of	
colonialism―such	 as	 Mochiji	 Rokusaburo	 and	 Tōgō	 Minoru, 17 	as	 well	 as	
Takekoshi―were	 acutely	 aware	 that	 the	 French	 turning	 away	 from	
assimilationism―which	 has	 long	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	 hallmark	 of	 French	
colonialism―and	 toward	 associationism	was	 a	 product	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 comparison.	
These	 Japanese	 theorists	gained	much	 inspiration	 from	the	ways	 the	French	theorists,	
such	 as	 Chailley-Bert,	 were	 advocating	 anti-assimilationism	 against	 the	 grain.	 The																															 																														 			
16	Lord	Cromer	was	an	admirer	of	Maine,	as	well	as	a	friend	and	close	associate	of	Lyall	(Mantena	
2010,	224	n89).	
17	Both	Mochiji	and	Tōgō	were	involved	in	Japanese	rule	in	Taiwan	at	the	beginning	of	the	
twentieth	century	as	colonial	administrators.	
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Japanese	 theorists	 did	 so	 in	 part	 because	 they	 were	 highly	 critical	 of	 assimilationism	
within	 Japan’s	 empire.	 In	 their	 efforts	 to	 shake	 off	 the	 assimilationist	 tendencies	
prevailing	 in	 the	 Japanese	 attitude	 toward	 colonialism,	 they	 considered	 the	 French	
politics	 of	 comparison	 immediately	 useful.	 The	 Japanese	 in	 question	were	 not	 simply	
making	 comparisons.	 It	 would	 be	 more	 accurate	 to	 say	 that	 they	 found	 themselves	
utilizing	a	range	of	politics	of	comparison	that	had	already	been	engaged	in	the	past	by	
others	 in	 the	French	and	other	empires	 (Mochiji	 1912,	575–593;	Mizutani	 2014,	443–
447).	It	was	against	the	background	of	these	transimperial	trajectories	of	colonial	theory	
and	practice	that	Takekoshi	understood	the	reasons	behind	France’s	willingness	to	use	
the	protectorate:	it	derived,	at	least	partly,	from	France’s	effort	to	make	its	own	colonial	
policy	more	“British.”		
Thus,	Takekoshi’s	promotion	of	the	Tunisia	model	did	not	indicate	any	intention	on	
his	part	to	embrace	French	colonialism	in	contradistinction	to	British	colonialism.	On	the	
contrary,	Takekoshi	never	failed	to	stress	the	influence	of	the	British	on	the	evolution	of	
modern	 colonial	 ideas	 and	 practices	 across	 empires.	 Ultimately,	 however,	 his	
comparative	vision	was	predicated	not	on	a	nation-specific	but	on	a	transimperial	frame	
of	 analysis	 that	 rejected	 any	 naive	 assumption	 of	 supposedly	 unchanging	 national	
characteristics,	such	as	“British”	or	“French.”	He	was	not	in	the	least	blindly	uncritical	of	
British	colonialism.	For	example,	as	with	other	Japanese	theorists	like	Tōgō,	he	regarded	
the	 British	 policy	 of	 educating	 Indian	 elites	 in	 English	 as	 one	 of	 the	 worst	 colonial	
policies	 ever	 attempted	 in	 history	 (Takekoshi	 1906a,	 228).	 Takekoshi’s	 politics	 of	
comparison	was	motivated	by	a	perceived	need	to	persuade	his	Japanese	readers	to	see	
beyond	conventional	categories	so	that	they	could	decide	which	kinds	of	colonial	policy	
were	to	be	selected	and	which	ones	were	to	be	dismissed.		
	
The	British	Proconsul	in	Egypt	as	the	Model	for	the	Japanese	Resident-General	
	
The	view	articulated	by	Takekoshi	Yosaburō,	that	the	institution	of	the	protectorate	had	
multiple	 origins,	 may	 partly	 explain	 a	 peculiar	 paradox	 of	 the	 Japanese	 politics	 of	
comparison.	Why	was	it	that,	despite	the	eventual	dismissal	of	British	rule	in	Egypt	as	a	
formal	institutional	model	for	Korea,	the	Japanese	press	still	frequently	referred	to	Lord	
Cromer,	 a	 British	 colonial	 administrator,	 as	 a	 model	 for	 the	 new	 Japanese	 Resident-
General?	Further,	the	same	press	hardly	mentioned	Paul	Cambon,	the	French	Resident-
General	 in	Tunisia	who	established	French	dominance	there.	Despite	the	French	origin	
of	 the	 institution	 of	 resident-generalship	 in	 Korea,	 almost	 invariably	 the	 British	
Proconsul	in	Egypt	was	the	individual	invoked	as	an	inspiration.		
It	was	common,	for	example,	to	compare	Itō	Hirobumi,	the	Japanese	politician	who	
actually	assumed	the	position	of	Resident-General,	with	Lord	Cromer,	as	was	done	by	a	
noted	 journalist,	 Toyabe	Shuntei,	 in	 an	article	 titled	 “Itō-kō,	 Kurōmā,	oyobi	 Lanessan”	
(Marquis	Itō,	Lord	Cromer,	and	de	Lanessan),	published	on	September	1,	1907.	Toyabe	
compared	British	and	French	colonialism,	concluding	that	he	could	not	help	“wishing	the	
Marquis	 [Itō]	 would	 become	 not	 like	 a	 French-style	 colonial	 politician	 but	 like	 Lord	
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Cromer.”	Toyabe	wrote,	“Britain’s	prerogative	to	protect	Egypt	had	not	been	defined	by	
[international]	 law,”	 forcing	 its	 administrators	 to	 work	 with	 considerable	 skill	 to	
compensate	for	the	lack	of	legal	sanction.	Lord	Cromer	would	be	the	prime	model	for	Itō	
precisely	 because	 of	 his	 ability	 to	 govern	 a	 territory	 that	 was	 not	 even	 an	 official	
protectorate.	As	for	French	colonialism,	Toyabe’s	judgment	was	strikingly	similar	to	that	
of	Takekoshi.	Toyabe	did	not	fail	to	acknowledge	Jean-Marie	de	Lanessan,	the	Governor	
of	 French	 Indochina	 from	 1891	 to	 1894,	 as	 the	 other	 prominent	 protectorate	 ruler	
besides	Lord	Cromer.	However,	whereas	Toyabe	praised	Lord	Cromer	for	his	exemplary	
“British”	 skill	 and	 pragmatism,	 he	 did	 not	 attribute	 de	 Lanessan’s	 qualities	 to	 his	
“Frenchness.”	Rather,	Toyabe	pointed	out	how	de	Lanessan	was	being	self-consciously	
“un-French”	by	 relinquishing	assimilationism	while	 serving	 in	 Indochina	 (Toyabe	1907,	
31–32).		
Even	after	the	Tunisia-inspired	institutionalization	of	resident-generalship	in	Korea,	
the	idea	of	Egypt	as	a	model	of	protectorate	rule	did	not	wither	away;	rather,	it	survived	
in	another	form.	Certainly,	the	position	of	Governor-General	was	modeled	on	a	“French”	
example.	However,	many	people,	including	British	observers,	thought	it	natural	that	the	
post	should	be	occupied	by	someone	with	the	stature	and	reputation	of	an	experienced	
British	 imperial	ruler	 like	Lord	Cromer.	As	Sir	John	Newell	Jordane	put	 it,	“If	 Japan	can	
find	a	Lord	Cromer	for	the	post	of	Resident-General	in	Seoul,	she	may	in	time	succeed	in	
effecting	an	appeasement	of	the	bitter	feeling	that	has	so	long	existed	between	the	two	
races”	(FO	Confidential	8703/45).	When	British	observers	learned	that	none	other	than	
Itō	Hirobumi,	 a	 former	 Prime	Minister	 of	 Japan,	 had	 been	 appointed,	 they	 expressed	
high	expectations	that	someone	as	prominent	as	Itō	could	indeed	play	the	role	of	Lord	
Cromer.18	Itō	himself	was	keenly	aware	that	he	was	expected	to	play	the	role	of	a	Lord	
Cromer,	rather	than	that	of	a	de	Lanessan	or	a	Cambon.	Claude	MacDonald,	the	British	
ambassador	in	Tokyo,	met	Itō	right	before	his	departure	for	Korea	on	November	1,	1905.	
He	reported	to	the	Foreign	Secretary	in	London	how	he	and	the	new	Resident-General	
agreed	that	Itō’s	role	in	Korea	was	going	to	be	the	same	as	that	of	Lord	Cromer,	under	
whom	MacDonald	had	served	in	Egypt	 in	1884	and	1885	before	coming	to	East	Asia.19	
Like	other	British	observers,	MacDonald	did	not	seem	to	be	bothered	by	 the	 fact	 that	
the	 Japanese	 government	 had	 adopted	 the	 Tunisia-inspired	 system	of	 administration.	
He	saw	a	continuum	between	Korea	and	Egypt	(rather	than	Tunisia),	a	view	to	which	Itō	
fully	subscribed.	As	MacDonald	wrote:																																 																														 			
18	For	example,	The	Times―a	London-based	newspaper―predicted	that	Itō,	as	the	first	Resident-
General,	was	going	to	face	the	challenge	of	the	“intractability”	and	“inveterate	prejudices”	that	
supposedly	characterized	Korean	politicians	and	court	favorites.	And	yet,	they	described	Itō	as	“a	
statesman	of	much	sagacity	and	experience”	similar	to	British	rulers	in	Egypt.	Thus,	The	Times	
was	sure	that	Itō	would	“work	in	Korea	wonders	as	great	and	as	beneficent	as	those	which	they	
have	accomplished	in	different,	but	perhaps	not	less	trying,	conditions	during	our	own	
occupation	of	Egypt”	(The	Times,	November	20,	1905,	9).	
19	MacDonald’s	early	career	was	in	Egypt.	During	1884–1885,	he	served	as	military	attaché	to	
Lord	Cromer.	
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I	ventured	to	remind	the	Marquis	[Itō]	that	the	secret	of	our	success	in	
Egypt	was	that	our	best	men	had	been	selected	to	organize	and	get	into	
working	order	the	various	Departments	of	the	Egyptian	Administration,	
Lord	Cromer	himself	being	a	man	of	the	very	highest	ability.	Under	his	
wise	and	statesmanlike	guidance	Egypt	had	been	administered	for,	and	
in	 the	 interests	 of,	 the	 Egyptians,	 and	 so	 I	 thought	 that	 Japan	 should	
send	her	 very	 best	 and	broad-minded	men	 to	 Corea	 [sic]	 to	 solve	 the	
many	difficult	problems	which	would	assuredly	arise,	and	to	administer	
the	country	for,	and	in	the	best	 interests	of,	the	Coreans.	The	Marquis	
[Itō]	 expressed	 himself	 in	 accord	 with	 my	 views,	 and	 said	 that	 the	
success	 of	 our	 Administration	 in	 Egypt	was	 an	 object-lesson	 to	 Japan,	
and	one	which	he	would	use	all	his	influence	to	make	her	take	to	heart	
and	 follow	 in	 her	 dealings	 with	 Corea.	 (FO	 Confidential	 3703/92;	
emphasis	added)	
	
Thus,	it	was	with	the	idea	of	Korea	as	“another	Egypt	in	East	Asia”	that	Itō	was	to	
assume	his	 role	as	 the	Resident-General,	and	once	 in	Korea,	he	met	 Japanese	officials	
like	Megata	Tanetaro	and	Inoue	Masaji	who,	like	himself,	believed	that	they	were	doing	
what	 the	 British	 had	 been	 doing	 in	 Egypt.	 Inoue,	 the	 Japanese	 translator	 of	Milner’s	
England	 in	 Egypt,	 brought	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 book	 to	 Itō,	 engaging	 him	 in	 a	 comparative	
discussion	of	Egypt	and	Korea	(Inoue	1928,	566).		
The	 legacy	 of	 Lord	 Cromer	 as	 a	 model	 administrator	 continued	 even	 after	 Itō’s	
death	by	assassination	in	1909	and	the	end	of	protectorate	rule	as	a	result	of	the	Japan-
Korea	 Annexation	 Treaty	 of	 1910	 the	 following	 year.	 In	 1911,	 for	 example,	 Lord	
Cromer’s	book	Modern	Egypt	 (1908)	was	 translated	 into	 Japanese.	The	preface	 to	 the	
translated	version	was	written	by	Ōkuma	Shiegenobu,	a	 former	colleague	of	 Itō,	who,	
like	him,	had	once	served	as	Japan’s	Prime	Minister.	In	the	preface,	Ōkuma	praised	the	
English	for	their	talents	as	great	colonizers	(Iwasaki	1909,	240–242).	He	had	confidence	
in	 Itō’s	 resident-generalship	precisely	because	of	 the	 latter’s	willingness	 to	 learn	 from	
Britain’s	colonial	experiences,	and	conveyed	that	if	there	is	to	be	a	Lord	Cromer	in	Korea,	
it	should	be	none	other	than	Itō	(Iwasaki	1909,	229–230).	In	the	same	preface,	Ōkuma	
recollected	 the	 time	 he	 sent	 Resident-General	 Itō	 a	 collection	 of	 speeches	 by	 Lord	
Cromer	as	a	gift	that	he	thought	would	serve	as	a	guide	for	the	Japanese,	who	by	now	
had	begun	to	rule	Korea	as	a	full	colony	(Ōkuma	1911,	12).20	In	fact,	the	annexation	did	
not	 stop	 Lord	 Cromer’s	 rule	 of	 Egypt	 from	 being	 used	 as	 a	 point	 of	 reference;	 even	
though	Korea	was	no	 longer	a	protectorate,	 it	 continued	 to	 inform	 Japanese	 rulers	 in	
Korea.		
	
																														 																														 			
20	For	a	discussion	of	the	historical	implications	of	Ōkuma’s	preface,	see	Kibata	(2007,	112–114).	
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Conclusion	
	
This	article	demonstrates	that,	on	several	grounds,	Japan’s	initial	colonization	of	Korea	
in	the	three-year	period	beginning	in	1904	can	be	plausibly	and	effectively	framed	as	a	
subject	 of	 transimperial	 history	 that	 takes	 seriously	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 politics	 of	
comparison.	First,	a	close	 look	at	 the	debate	among	concerned	Japanese	has	revealed	
the	extent	to	which	various	observers	contemplated	the	situation	 in	Korea	 in	terms	of	
analogical	 thinking.	 This	 thinking	 was	 based	 on	 intense	 and	 organized	 inquiries	 into	
supposedly	 similar	 colonial	 situations	 unfolding	 in	 and	 across	 other	 empires.	 In	 this	
context	Egypt	under	British	rule,	along	with	Tunisia	as	a	French	protectorate,	emerged	
as	 a	 model.	 It	 is	 not	 an	 exaggeration	 to	 say	 that	 Japan’s	 policy	 to	 make	 Korea	 a	
protectorate	can	never	be	fully	grasped	without	considering	its	extensive	engagement	in	
the	politics	of	comparison.	The	protectorate	treaties	concluded	from	1904	to	1907	were	
all	 based	 on	 the	 comparative	 studies	 that	 the	 Japanese	 government	 conducted	 on	
various	protectorates.	The	case	of	Japanese	rule	in	Korea	in	these	years	can	be	taken	as	
a	vivid	example	of	how	comparative	reasoning	not	only	shaped	the	contours	of	debate	
on	colonial	policy	but	went	so	far	as	to	condition―if	not	determine―political	decision-
making.		
Second,	our	attempt	to	understand	the	seemingly	contradictory	ways	in	which	the	
Japanese	 simultaneously	 explored	 the	 possibilities	 of	 two	 models	 derived	 from	 the	
preceding	 experiences	 of	 rival	 empires―the	 British	 and	 French―has	 shown	 the	
relevance	of	transimperial	interactions	for	the	global	evolution	of	various	protectorates,	
including	 the	 Japanese	 protectorate	 of	 Korea.	 Without	 a	 doubt,	 the	 extraordinary	
importance	that	 the	 Japanese	government	attached	to	comparison	was	due	 in	part	 to	
the	 country’s	 international	 position	 at	 the	 time.	 Japan	was	 a	 very	 young	 empire	with	
only	 a	 decade	 of	 experience	 in	 colonial	 government.	 Considerable	 uncertainties	 lay	
ahead,	 and	 Japan’s	 political	 leaders,	 state	 functionaries,	 and	 concerned	 intellectuals	
were	naturally	hungry	for	information	on	various	colonial	experiences	in	the	rest	of	the	
world.	 This	 hunger	 alone	 hardly	 accounts,	 however,	 for	 the	 phenomenal	 salience	 of	
comparison	 in	 the	 Korean	 context	 under	 consideration.	 By	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century,	
comparative	knowledge	had	become	important	for	all	empires	practicing	colonial	rule.	
The	Japanese	Empire	was	not	the	only	one	in	which	the	politics	of	comparison	played	a	
significant	 historical	 role.	 For	 example,	 the	 adoption	 of	 protectorate	 rule	 that	
increasingly	characterized	France’s	approach	to	colonialism	was	 in	part	a	consequence	
of	its	strategic	learning	from	British	colonial	experiences.	Identifying	French	colonialism	
uncritically	 with	 “Republican	 assimilationism”―conventionally	 regarded	 as	 its	
essence―would	 blind	 us	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 transimperial	 comparison	 on	 the	
transformations	of	French	colonial	policy	over	time.		
Careful	 attention	 to	 such	 transimperial	 evolutions	 and	 circulations	 of	 colonial	
theories	and	practices	urges	us	to	go	beyond	nation-based	categories	of	colonial	history.	
The	protectorate	rule	in	Korea	was	not	purely	“Japanese”	any	more	than	French	rule	in	
Tunisia―serving	as	an	institutional	model	for	the	former―was	quintessentially	“French,”	
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as	 has	 conventionally	 been	 understood.	 Neither	 was	 the	 “British”	 approach	 to	
colonialism	necessarily	privileged	as	a	universal	model	to	be	emulated	without	question.	
The	 ideas	 and	 examples	 associated	 with	 British	 indirect	 rule	 were	 tremendously	
influential	 among	 those	 Japanese	 involved	 in	 Korean	 affairs,	 and	 British	 rule	 in	 Egypt	
under	the	leadership	of	Lord	Cromer	consistently	supplied	them	with	inspiration.	But,	at	
the	same	time,	they	also	recognized	the	practical	difficulties	of	directly	transplanting	the	
Egypt	model,	not	least	because	of	its	characteristically	informal	character,	thus	revealing	
its	shortcomings	in	the	kind	of	legal	and	administrative	specificities	otherwise	required	
for	 direct	 borrowing.	 Hence,	 the	 Japanese	 eventually	 selected	 Tunisia	 as	 a	 model,	
though	 for	 the	 specific	 purpose	 of	 legal	 and	 institutional	 systematization	 and	 not	
necessarily	through	general	inspiration.		
Viewed	 as	 a	 whole,	 what	 emerged	 in	 Korea	 after	 the	 first	 three	 years	 of	
colonization	by	Japan	was	the	regime	of	a	colonial	protectorate	significantly	inspired	by,	
and	modeled	 on,	multiple	 examples	 of	 colonial	 rule	 experienced	 in	 other	 empires.	 In	
more	than	one	sense	it	was	a	product	of	the	politics	of	comparison.	During	these	years,	
various	Japanese	people	joined	the	debate,	and	their	acts	of	comparison	reflected	their	
different	 political	 views	 and	 agendas.	 The	 relations	 among	 these	 diverse	 comparative	
arguments	 were	 complicated	 and	 ambivalent,	 often	 with	 no	 clear-cut	 demarcations.	
Nonetheless,	over	time,	some	of	the	arguments	turned	out	to	be	more	influential	than	
others,	resulting	in	the	emergence	of	a	composite	and	hybrid	framework	of	colonial	rule	
based	on	British	as	well	as	French	experiences.	Although	this	framework	was	formed	in	
ways	determined	largely	by	the	conditions	of	the	specific	colonial	situation	in	Korea	at	
the	time,	the	ideas	that	informed	the	Japanese	politics	of	comparison―which	played	a	
historical	role	in	conditioning	a	range	of	possible	perspectives	and	decisions	―were	not	
themselves	 completely	 original.	 They	 were	 heavily	 inspired	 by	 how	 actors	 in	 other	
empires	had	practiced	their	own	politics	of	comparison	with	their	specific	motives	and	
agendas.	Only	by	considering	the	influence	of	these	transimperial	evolutions	of	colonial	
ideas	 and	 practices	 can	 the	 scope	 and	 limits	 of	 Egypt	 as	 a	 model	 for	 Korea	 be	 fully	
understood.		
Foregrounding	 the	 historical	 significance	 of	 comparison	 for	 various	 colonizing	
nations	 is	 a	 key	 step	 toward	 establishing	 “transimperial	 history”	 as	 a	 viable	 field	 of	
research.	Transimperial	historians	are	not	comparatists:	rather,	they	subject	comparison	
itself	 to	critical	 scrutiny.	One	might	wonder,	of	course,	how	they,	as	historians,	would	
manage	 to	 remain	 completely	 free	 of	 comparative	 thinking	 when	 the	 comparative	
frame	 of	 mind	 is	 so	 deeply	 ingrained	 in	 their	 discipline.	 Indeed,	 going	 beyond	
comparison	might	not	be	so	straightforward	a	move	as	the	practitioners	of	transimperial	
history	would	hope.21	Nonetheless,	I	would	argue	that	it	is	time	to	try	to	break	the	mold,	
not	least	in	order	to	renew	and	deepen	our	critical	engagements	with	some	of	the	dire	
problems	 of	 our	 time,	 including	 the	 question	 of	 colonial	 responsibility.	 How	 should																															 																														 			
21	For	more	on	this	point,	see	my	introduction	to	this	special	issue	of	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	
History	and	Culture	Review	(https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-32/	
introduction).		
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historians	 try	 to	 determine	 who	 and	 what	 were	 responsible	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	
particular	colonial	regimes	or	policies,	and	by	extension,	 for	the	 injustice,	exploitation,	
and	 violence	 that	 occurred	 thereunder?	 Traditionally,	 historians	 have	 remained	
surprisingly	 faithful	 to	 the	 national,	 or	 “mono-imperial,”	 framework	 in	 asking	 this	
question.	 Korea	 as	 a	 protectorate	 is	 a	 case	 in	 point.	 Across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	
historians―Japanese,	Korean,	or	other―who	are	committed	to	this	theme	have	tended	
to	focus	exclusively	on	Japan’s	historical	role	at	the	expense	of	ignoring	or	downplaying	
the	possible	influence	of	other	empires.		
My	argument	here	is	not	that	Britain	or	France	was	responsible	for	Korea’s	fate	as	a	
colonized	 nation	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 Japan:	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 Japanese	
government	 was	 directly	 responsible.	 Nor	 should	 my	 emphasis	 on	 transimperial	
comparison	 be	 taken	 as	 allowing	 historians	 to	 make	 Japan’s	 colonial	 responsibility	
equivocal.	 Rather,	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 should	 be	 taken	 as	 an	 indication	 of	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 different	 powers	 proceeded	 with	 their	 respective	 acts	 of	 colonial	
domination	 in	 a	 heightened	 atmosphere	 of	mutual	 awareness	 and	 interaction.	 In	 the	
age	 of	 imperialism,	 particularly	 from	 the	 scramble	 for	 Africa	 onward,	 the	 various	
colonial	empires,	old	and	new,	did	not	just	compete;	they	expanded	side	by	side,	partly	
by	learning	from	one	another,	and	this	global	occurrence	of	transimperial	collaboration	
made	 them	 collectively	 responsible	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 various	 colonial	 regimes	 across	
different	regions.	Recognition	of	this	phenomenon	has	critical	implications	for	trying	to	
understand	 the	 arrival	 of	 colonialism	 in	 East	 Asia	 from	 a	 global	 perspective.	 The	
colonization	of	Korea	in	this	period	was	not	a	solo	act	by	Japan.	It	was	in	part	an	act	of	
collaboration	with	Britain,	a	nation	whose	imperialism	was	operating	not	just	in	Asia	but	
in	 almost	 every	 corner	 of	 the	 world.	 Partly	 because	 of	 the	 geographical	 distance	
involved,	Britain	did	not	 intend	to	colonize	Korea	by	 itself.	However,	 it	 is	 important	to	
register	 the	 fact	 that	Britain	was	 responsible,	albeit	 indirectly,	 for	 the	emergence	of	a	
colonial	protectorate	 in	 the	Korean	peninsula.	British	officials	 and	observers	were	not	
only	willing	to	let	Japan	colonize	Korea	on	behalf	of	their	empire,	but,	as	shown	in	this	
article,	wanted	the	colonization	by	Japan	to	be	executed	in	as	British	a	way	as	possible,	
with	 Egypt	 under	 Lord	 Cromer’s	 rule	 serving	 as	 a	 model.22	The	 case	 of	 Korea	 as	 a	
protectorate	is	an	illuminating	example	of	how	studying	historical	comparison	can	help	
us	 ask	 important	 questions	 about	 colonialism	 from	 a	 fresh	 perspective:	 comparison	
played	definite	historical	roles,	serving	colonialism	to	propagate	itself	in	a	world	where	
its	different	perpetrators	co-existed	in	increasingly	intimate	relations	of	complicity.23		
																															 																														 			
22	How	the	British	responded	to	both	Japan’s	self-asserted	rights	in	Korea	and	the	Korean	claim	
to	independence,	and	what	politics	of	comparison	underwrote	these	responses	are	extremely	
important	questions	whose	answers	require	detailed	research.	My	empirical	work	on	these	
points	is	still	underway,	though	some	parts	of	it	were	presented	in	a	paper	at	the	3rd	TUDOKU	
Conference	(Mizutani	2017).	
23	Recognition	of	this	deep	complicity	is	a	motif	of	Takashi	Fujitani’s	work,	which	analyzes	the	
strategies	of	military	mobilization	in	both	the	Japanese	and	American	empires	(Fujitani	2013).	
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